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JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction in the Appellant's Brief is
accurate.
ISSUES
1.

In ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, did

the trial court correctly conclude as a matter of law in quashing the preliminary injunction and in denying permanent injunctive relief that:
a.

The covenant in the subdivision which restricts

roofs to wood shingles is unenforceable because there has been
a change in circumstances with regard to the character of the
subdivision which neutralizes the benefit of the restriction
or which is of such a nature as to render it valueless; and
b.

Roofing materials may be restricted under the covenants

only if the color and quality of the material does not blend
harmoniously with the character and environment of the subdivision ?
2.

Also did the trial court abuse its discretion in

denying appellant's motion for new trial ?
The standards of review cited in the Appellant's brief are
appropriate.
DETERMINATIVE RULE
Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in
part with regard to summary judgment: "The judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affi-3-

davits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This case involves a determination of the circumstances
under which a trial court may, as a matter of law, correctly
conclude that a particular provision of restrictive covenants
is unenforceable because of changes which have occurred in
the subdivision subject to the restrictions.
-

Course of Proceedings.
The description of the course of the proceedings in the

Appellant's Brief (pp 3-6) is accurate except that:
The trial court viewed the subdivision with the consent
of the parties. (R 360, 638)
The trial court's minute entry speaks for itself, but the
Appellant's brief fails to note that the Court found that there
has been a substantial change of circumstances in the subdivision. (R 361).
The allegation that the committee had tacitly approved
non-wood roofs was first raised in the answer of the Appellees.
(R 47)

It was then addressed in the affidavit of Lynn B. Larsen

(R 205). The affidavits filed by Appellees regarding this matter
to which reference is made in Appellant's brief are not identified by reference to the record. However, such affidavits appear to be among those filed by Appellees (R 441, R 447) in
-4-

response to the affidavit of Peter M. Johnson supporting
Appellant. (R 395)
The Appellant's characterization of the trial court's
modification of its minute entry (R 361) by its order (R 628)
as being "substantial" is argumentative and conclusory. In
fact the latter document did modify the former.
Disposition in Trial Court.
Again the statement in Appellant's brief regarding disposition in trial court is accurate except that:
It is the contention of the Appellees that the key element
in the trial court's disposition of this matter was its conclusion that: "There has been a change in circumstances in the subdivision which neutralizes the benefits of the restrictive
covenant or which is or such a nature as to render it valueless,
thus rendering the restriction unenforceable."
-

Statement of Facts.
For purposes of this appeal only, the Appellees accept the

statement of facts in the Appellant's brief except that:
The facts as stated do not address what Appellees view as
the pivotal conclusion in the trial court's order, the changed
circumstances in the subdivision. As such the Appellant's statement of facts is immaterial to the issue of changed circumstances
in the subdivision on which the trial court's order stands.
(R 361, R 631)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its ruling, the trial court correctly considered the
-5-

change in circumstances of the subdivision with regard to the
narrow requirement of the restrictive covenants that roofs must
be of wood shingles. This the trial court did by touring the
subdivision with counsel for the parties present.
Based on the trial court's viewing of the subdivision, the
court was able to confirm that over 28% of the residences have
non-wood roofs, that some of the wood roofs were of shake rather
than shingle, and that the wood roofs were not otherwise uniform. Comparing the wood roofs with the non-wood roofs, the trial
court also observed that the wood roofs showed greater signs of
wear than did the non-wood roofs.
These observations were sufficient for the trial court to
conclude correctly that the narrow "wood shingle" restriction has
no further value. However, the trial court again correctly ruled
that, even without the valueless wood shingle restriction, the
overall purposes of the restrictive covenants would be advanced
by requiring roofing materials to comply with the broader restriction that their color and quality be such that the materials
blend harmoniously with the current neighborhood environment.
Therefore the restrictive covenants as a whole, except for the
narrow requirement that roofs be of wood shingles, were untouched
by the trial court's ruling.
These conclusions of the trial court were correct as a matter of law and were not based on disputed facts. Facts with regard to which disputes exist relate to issues which need not be
determined for this dispute to be resolved as a matter of law.
-6-

ARGUMENT
1.

A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD
MAY RENDER A PARTICULAR COVENANT NO LONGER ENFORCEABLE IF
THE CHANGE IS SO GREAT THAT IT CLEARLY NEUTRALIZES THE
BENEFITS OF THE RESTRICTION TO THE POINT OF DEFEATING ITS
PURPOSE OR THAT THE CHANGE IS OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO RENDER
THE COVENANT VALUELESS.
This rule of law is stated in Crimmins v. Simonds, 636

P.2d 478, 479 (Utah 1981). However, the Appellant's brief argues
that the trial court incorrectly applied this rule and instead
should have determined the outcome of the case by applying the
doctrine of waiver. (Appellant's brief, 19). In doing so, the
Appellant's argument does not question whether or not there has
been a change of circumstances in the subdivision. Instead the
argument challenges the trial court's concluding as a matter of
law that the change either neutralizes the benefits of the restriction or is of such a nature as to render it valueless.
The trial court did correctly apply the Crimmins rule in
this case.
The wood shingle restriction appears in section 2 of the
covenants dealing with architectural control, and the recurrent emphasis of the section is that materials shall "blend
harmoniously into the natural environment". The trial court
observed that there was a lack of uniformity among the roofs,
but that there was little difference in appearance among the
roofs.
-7-

It is true that there are conflicting affidavits with regard to the enhancement value of wood roofs. However the covenants speak of maintaining, not enhancing, value; and there is
nothing before the trial court which contradicts the observation that wood roofs, because of bleaching and warping, exhibit
greater signs of wear than do the non-wood roofs. (R 629)
The benefit of value of a particular restriction with regard to which circumstances have changed can only be determined
within the context of the purposes of the covenants and the
values which the covenants seek to enhance or maintain.
Given the undisputed changed circumstances of the subdivision with regard to uniformity, the wood shingle restriction
adds no benefit or value which cannot be maintained by otherwise more broadly restricting the color and quality of roofing
materials.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS SUSTAINABLE BASED ON MATTERS
WITH REGARD TO WHICH NO DISPUTE EXISTS.
After hearing oral arguments on the cross motions for sum-

mary judgment, the trial court reserved ruling on the matter
until the houses in the subdivision were viewed by the court.
(R 3 60)

It is uncontested that this was done with the consent

of the parties.
The law in Utah is that the mere existence of genuine issues
of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude the entry of
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to the resolution
of the case. Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751, 752
-8-

(Utah 1982).
If they would not establish a basis upon which plaintiff could recover, no matter how they were resolved,
it would be useless to consume time, effort and expense in trying them, the saving of which is the very
purpose of summary judgment procedure. The pertinent
inquiry is whether under any view of the facts the
plaintiff could recover. Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific
Railway Company, 318 P.2d 339, 341 (Utah 1957).
There is no question that it was appropriate for the trial
court to observe the subdivision before ruling on the cross
motions. For the court to have done otherwise would have been
akin to its failing to read a contract whose enforcement would
fall if found to be ambiguous.
The question then is whether or not under any view of the
circumstances the trial court could have determined that the
benefits of the wood shingle restriction were not neutralized by
the changed circumstances or that the restriction had value given
the changed circumstances.
The Utah Court of Appeals recently addressed the level of
evidence required by a non-moving party to avoid summary
judgment.
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56 (c) mandates
the entry of summary judgment ... against as party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case
and on which that party would have the burden of proof
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine
issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law" because the non-moving
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of her case with respect to which she
has the burden of proof. Schafir v. HarriaanP 254 Utah
Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Utah App. 1994) quoting Celotex Corp.
-9-

v, Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
2552 (1986).
With regard to summary judgment in equitable matters, it has
been said: "...[I]f there are no triable issues of fact and the
court believes equitable relief is warranted, it is fully empowered to grant it on a Rule 56 Motion." Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, v. 10A, p. 302 (1983).
In the Missouri case upon which Appellant relies, Connelly
v. Schafer, 837 S.W.2d 344 (Mo.App.W.D. 1992), the court found
no reason to overrule the trial court's decision enforcing a restrictive roof covenant under circumstances different from those
in the case now before this Court. However that case does serve
to illustrate the distinct nature of the "changed conditions"
issue from the "waiver" issue. Connelly at 347-348.
When reviewing a matter for correctness under the law, the
court may sustain the trial court on any legal ground, even one
which the trial court did not address. See, for example, Higains
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993). So in the
case now before this Court it may view any of the trial court's
conclusions of law and determine whether or not it is sustainable
as a matter of law under undisputed facts which are material to
that issue.
Here the trial court was asked to enforce the narrow "wood
shingle" restriction of the covenant, but the court had before it
the undisputed fact that of the 81 houses built as of July 26,
1991, there were 23 which were non-wood. (R 629)

These numbers

reflect a lack of conformity in 28% of the structures existing at
-10-

that time without taking into account wood roofs which used
shakes instead of shingles.
Additionally it is undisputed that the wood roofs showed
greater signs of wear than did the non-wood roofs. (R 629)
Finally it is undisputed that the covenants, even without
the wood restriction, still provide that the color and quality
of roofing materials must blend harmoniously with the current
neighborhood environment.
Viewing these undisputed facts in the context of the stated
overall ends of the restrictive covenants, the trial court correctly concluded that the wood shingle restriction was no longer
enforceable but that the color and quality of roofing materials
must blend harmoniously with the character and environment of
the subdivision.
With the narrow wood shingle restriction now unenforceable,
it was proper for the trial court to quash the preliminary injunction requiring compliance with the restriction and proper
for the trial court to deny permanent injunctive relief to prohibit deviation from a restriction which is no longer enforceable.
3.

WITH THE TRIAL COURT HAVING RULED THAT THE WOOD SHINGLE RESTRICTION IS UNENFORCEABLE, IT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
THERE WAS NO OTHER BASIS FOR GRANTING THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANT.
With the trial court having determined that the wood shingle

restriction of the covenants was no longer enforceable because of
-11-

changed circumstances, the Appellant's argument that a violation
of the restriction per se was the cause of irreparable harm
failed. The court provided the Appellant with the opportunity to
sustain a finding that the Appellees' non-wood roof caused some
other form of irreparable harm for which injunctive relief was
appropriate. However, the trial court found no such basis which
could not be offset by the requirement that roofs must be of a
color and quality so as to blend harmoniously with the natural
environment of the subdivision as it now exists.
The trial court addressed this issue in its colloquy with
Appellant's counsel at the hearing on November 8, 1993. (R 496497)
4.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING PROPERLY ALLOWS RESIDENTS OF THE
SUBDIVISION TO COME BEFORE IT SEEKING RELIEF IF A PARTICULAR ROOF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE COLOR AND QUALITY OF
MATERIAL PROVISION OF THE COVENANTS.
The trial court's ruling does not prevent any resident

of the subdivision from seeking enforcement of the covenants with
regard to the color and quality of roofing materials. However,
the Appellant did not satisfy the trial court that the roofing
materials used by Appellees caused harm which would merit injunctive relief.
5.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IS DENYING APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL.
On November 1, 1993, the Appellees submitted affidavits ad-

dressing issues, some new, which were raised in affidavits sub-12-

mitted by the Appellant. The issues addressed in these affidavits
were immaterial to a determination of whether or not changed circumstances in the subdivision rendered the wood shingle restriction unenforceable; and even if they were material, the Appellant
had the opportunity to submit counter affidavits, having filed a
motion for new trial on December 31, 1993. (R 604)

Additionally,

the court heard oral arguments regarding the Appellant's motion.
Therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion is
denying Appellant's motion for new trial.
6.

THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR THE APPELLANT.
If summary relief is to be granted Appellant, there

must exist no genuine issue of material fact with regard to
any possible basis for granting such relief. But even if it
were found as a matter of law that circumstances did not
change so as to render the wood roof restriction unenforceable, there are disputed facts upon which the final determination of that issue would rest. Likewise with regard to the
issue of waiver.
Therefore the record does not support summary judgment for the Appellant.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law the trial court correctly determined
that the wood roof restriction of the covenants is unenforceable because of changed circumstances in the subdivision.
Also as a matter of law the trial court correctly declared that
-13-

roofing materials are subject to generally applicable standards
regarding color and quality under the covenants. Lastly, the
trial court correctly determined the procedural rights of subdivision residents are protected by affirming their right to
seek relief under the circumstances of particular cases subject
to generally applicable standards of equity and law.
On the other hand, the trial court did not commit reversible
error by denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment or by
denying Appellant a new trial.
Therefore the trial court's order should be affirmed. However, if it is not affirmed, the matter should be remanded for
clarification by the trial court of its basis for ruling as it
did under the law.
Respectfully submitted this 15th dayLof September,
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